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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the application and effectiveness of a 2006 Indiana law designed to 
prevent gun violence by authorizing police officers to separate firearms from persons who 
present imminent or future risk of injury to self or others, or display a propensity for violent or 
emotionally unstable conduct. A court hearing is later held to determine ongoing risk in these 
cases; a judge decides whether to return the seized firearms or retain them for up to 5 years. 
The study examines the frequency of criminal arrest as well as suicide outcomes for 395 gun-
removal actions in Indiana. Fourteen individuals (3.5%) eventually died from suicide, 7 (1.8%) 
using a firearm. The study population’s annualized suicide rate was about 31 times higher than 
that of the general adult population in Indiana, demonstrating that the law is being applied to a 
population at genuinely high risk. By extrapolating information on the case fatality rate for 
different methods of suicide, the researchers calculated that 1 life was saved for every 10 gun-
removal actions, confirming a previous study’s results in Connecticut. Key stakeholders’ 
perspectives from open-ended interviews regarding the law’s function are also presented along 
with implications for gun policy reform and implementation. 
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Gun violence prevention advocates in the United States have focused much attention on 
point-of-sale background checks as a key to preventing risky individuals from accessing 
firearms.0F1 However, many people who pose a high risk of harming others or themselves have 
no gun-disqualifying record under current laws and would pass a background check. Many 
others at risk are legally disqualified but still obtain firearms in private transactions that avoid a 
background check.  Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) could help overcome some of the 
shortcomings of background checks in keeping guns out of the wrong hands.1F2 ERPO laws 
authorize local police with a civil court order to temporarily remove firearms from people who 
demonstrate a high risk of inflicting harm to self or others. Thirteen states—California,2F3 
Connecticut,3F4 Delaware,4F5 Florida,5F6 Illinois,6F7 Indiana,7F8 Maryland,8F9 Massachusetts,9F10 New 
Jersey,10F11 Oregon,11F12 Rhode Island,12F13 Vermont,13F14 and Washington14F15—and the District of 
Columbia15F16 have enacted laws that authorize risk-based, time-limited gun removal through a 
civil court procedure. Several other states are considering bills with similar provisions. There is 
limited research on how ERPOS work in different jurisdictions and whether they save lives. This 
article extends the evidence from our recent evaluation of Connecticut’s risk-warrant law to 
examine the implementation and effectiveness of a similar regime in Indiana, the second state 
to enact such a law in the United States. 
Our previous study in Connecticut, a record-based follow-up analysis of 762 gun-
removal cases, found evidence that the law was effective in preventing suicides; we estimated 
that for every 10 to 20 gun-removal actions, 1 life was saved.16F17 Another research group 
recently reported results of a quasi-experimental study of state population-level death rates 
suggesting that gun-removal laws in both Connecticut and Indiana have reduced suicide and 
5 
 
homicide rates in those states.17F18 Parker’s earlier study described certain aspects of the 
population subjected to gun seizure in Marion County, Indiana, but did not examine subsequent 
violence-related outcomes.18F19 The current study adds to this literature by examining arrest and 
criminal conviction as well as suicide outcomes, at the individual level, in the Indiana gun 
seizure population.  
By design, risk-based gun removal is a public health intervention and not a criminal 
justice action; a court’s decision to retain a person’s firearms is made in a civil proceeding and is 
not intended to be criminalizing. Thus, an important empirical question in evaluating these laws 
is whether gun seizure in practice is associated with criminal arrest, either in conjunction with 
the confiscation incident itself, or by selectively targeting people whose risky behavior makes 
them more likely to be involved with the criminal justice system. A second question is whether, 
and to what extent, people whose guns are removed under the aegis of such laws avoid future 
criminal activity involving guns and are prevented from gun suicide. We take up these 
questions. 
In what follows, we analyze patterns in matched arrest and death records for 395 gun-
seizure subjects in Indiana to build further evidence regarding the implementation and 
effectiveness of risk-based firearm-removal policies. Comparing the year before and after gun 
seizure, we determine what proportion of subjects were arrested and convicted for crimes 
committed with and without guns; the frequency of arrest in conjunction with the gun seizure 
event itself, and whether these arrests resulted in conviction; and how many of these 
individuals eventually died of suicide, using which methods, and how many more might have 
died had their guns not been removed. In general, we examine how the law has worked, and 
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how well, in a state with fewer gun control laws and far more guns and gun deaths than 
Connecticut.19F20,20F21 Beyond the quantitative empirical analysis, we explore barriers and challenges 
to implementing the law and its perceived fairness and success in open-ended narrative 
interviews with key stakeholders and actors in Indiana’s gun removal process.  
RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA SOURCES 
The study combined descriptive statistics, a quasi-experimental analysis, and informal 
qualitative research methods to evaluate Indiana’s risk-based firearm removal law. IRB approval 
was obtained from Indiana University and Duke University. Researchers assembled and coded a 
cross-agency administrative record database on all individuals with gun seizure cases (N=395) 
that were processed in Marion County, which subsumes the city of Indianapolis (2010 Census 
population 903,393), from 2006 to 2013. For seven individuals with more than one gun-removal 
event, only the first instance was included in the dataset. Personal descriptors and event-
related information in court documents were linked to statewide records of arrest and criminal 
conviction pertaining to the same individuals during the year before and after gun removal. 
Death records, including cause of death, were also matched for decedents in the study through 
2017.  
Variables included: demographic characteristics (age, sex, race), police-reported 
circumstances leading to firearm seizure (suicidal or homicidal ideation, domestic disturbance, 
mental health or other cognitive dysfunction, substance abuse), other police action at the time 
(arrest, transport to hospital emergency department), number of firearms seized, length of 
time between seizure and resolution of the case, outcome of court proceedings, and criminal 
charges associated with arrests and convictions during the year before and after gun removal. 
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When more than one criminal charge resulted from a single arrest, the most serious offense 
was attributed to that arrest, along with firearm involvement if noted. Crimes were categorized 
according to the FBI’s two-tier Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system. UCR Tier 1 crimes 
include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor 
vehicle theft, and arson. Tier 2 crimes include other (less serious) assaults, forgery and 
counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, stolen property (buying, receiving, possessing), 
vandalism, weapons (carrying, possessing), prostitution and commercialized vice, other sex 
offenses, drug abuse violations, gambling, offenses against the family and children, driving 
under the influence, liquor laws, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy and loitering. Two 
investigators (KAH, CMB) independently categorized the crimes into UCR tiers and reconciled 
any discrepancies. Regarding death records, variables included the date of death, whether the 
death was a suicide and, if so, the method of suicide. 
Standard descriptive and associational statistics (means, percentages, Chi-square tests with 
p-values) were used to summarize patterns in the arrest and criminal conviction data. To 
evaluate the law’s effectiveness in preventing suicides, we used known case-fatality rates 
associated with alternative methods of suicide to estimate the number of suicide attempts and 
the additional number of fatalities that would have been expected in the study population if 
guns had not been removed.    
For the interview component of the study, an expert panel of researchers identified key 
topical areas related to different stakeholders’ involvement with the law, their beliefs and 
attitudes regarding the law’s rationale, its purpose and effectiveness, and perceived barriers 
and facilitators of implementation. Researchers developed a semi-structured interview guide 
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based on these areas for discussion. One of the co-investigators, a forensic psychiatrist (GFP), 
conducted the open-ended interviews with key stakeholders in Marion County. Participants 
included two police officers who oversaw gun seizure cases, two judges who conducted 
hearings and rendered decisions on whether to retain or return seized firearms, and a 
prosecutor assigned to present these cases. The interviewees were selected based on their 
experiences with the law’s implementation and using the network contacts of the Indiana 
based co-investigator (GFP). The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. Quotations 
were selected to illuminate the potential benefits as well as practical challenges encountered in 
implementing Indiana’s gun seizure law from the subjective perspectives of key actors who 
were involved in the legal process. In this paper, we refer to the five people we interviewed as 
“informants” or “interviewees” and to individuals whose guns were seized as “subjects” or 
“respondents.” 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Statistical description of gun seizure respondents and events 
From 2006-2013, the Indiana statute was applied to remove firearms from 395 individuals 
in Marion County. Table 1 describes the demographic characteristics of individuals whose 
firearms were removed, the frequency of documented reasons for removal, number of firearms 
removed, and actions taken by police regarding transport and arrest of the individual. The 
majority of cases involved white men with suicidal ideation where police removed more than 
one firearm and transported the individual involuntarily to a hospital for evaluation without an 
arrest.  
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[Table 1 here] 
Despite the statutory guideline that an initial hearing be held within 14 days of gun seizure, 
convening parties often encountered delays. On average, 287 days elapsed from the date of 
gun seizure to the date of a court decision regarding the disposition of seized firearms. More 
than half of the subjects (53.2%) failed to appear at the scheduled court hearing. More than a 
quarter of cases (28.9%) were dismissed following a court hearing and the guns were returned 
to the owner. Guns were retained by court order in 62.5% of cases and 2.0% of respondents 
voluntarily surrendered their guns. In 5.8% of cases, guns were transferred to a family member 
or associate of the owner. About 1 in 10 gun-seizure respondents (8.9%) agreed to have police 
destroy their guns.  
Outcomes of follow-up court hearings were available for 108 cases. These hearings were 
held to consider whether to return guns to the owner in cases where guns had been retained, 
or to retain guns in cases where the respondent had failed to appear at the initial hearing. In 
69.4% of these follow-up hearings, respondents failed to appear, which resulted in their guns 
being destroyed. Guns were returned in 5.6% of the 108 cases, and returned to a designated 
third party (e.g., a family member) in 2.8% of these cases. A quarter of the 108 cases (25.9%) 
were dismissed. Seven individuals were the subject of more than one gun-seizure.  
Criminal arrest and conviction patterns  
A match to state arrest records revealed that about 1 in 4 (25.1%, n=99) of the gun seizure 
respondents were arrested at least once during the two-year study period, including 32 
individuals (8.1%) who were arrested twice or more. During the year after gun removal, 15 
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individuals (3.6%) were arrested for a crime classified as Tier 1 by the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Report System; 7 (1.8%) were convicted. Eight subjects (2.0%) were arrested for a gun-related 
charge during the year after removal, and 2 (0.5%) were convicted. Of those arrested at any 
time, 89.9% (n=89) were male. As a group, arrestees were significantly younger at the time of 
gun confiscation than those who were not arrested (37.0 vs. 44.7, p < 0.001). 
Among the 99 arrested individuals, most (63.6%, n=63) were subsequently convicted. Of the 
63 who were convicted, 9 (14.3%) were charged with a Tier 1 offense. Most of the convicted 
group (73.0%, n=46) had convictions resulting from arrests only during or after the gun seizure 
event. Convicted respondents had a mean age of 35.6 years at the time of gun seizure, and 
most (88.9%, n=56) were male.  
Reasons for initial gun seizure differed between those who had an arrest during the study 
window and those who did not. Comparing those with any arrest to those with no arrest, 
homicidal ideation was more often noted as the reason for gun seizure (33.3% vs. 16.9%) and 
suicidal ideation was less often noted (55.6% vs. 72.3%), as displayed in Table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
Slightly more individuals experienced an arrest in the year following the gun seizure than in 
the year preceding the gun seizure (14.7% vs. 9.6%). Twenty respondents (5.1%) were matched 
with an official arrest record occurring in the immediate period surrounding the gun seizure 
event, from 4 days before to 4 days following gun seizure. This is somewhat less than the 
number of respondents (n=32) that the police reported arresting in connection with the gun 
seizure action at the time. The difference would be accounted for if a few of the individuals that 
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the police transported to a hospital were initially reported as being arrested, but criminal 
charges were not filed.  
Fourteen individuals (3.5%) were charged with offenses involving firearms at some time 
during the study window, for a total of 16 gun-related charges, as represented in Table 3. 
Thirteen of those charged with gun crimes were male, and their average age was 38.4 years. 
Handguns were seized from 12 (85.7%) of these individuals. Homicidal ideation was the most 
common reason for gun removal in these cases (57.1%, n=8), followed by suicidal ideation, 
domestic violence, and mental or cognitive problems. Of the 14 people charged with firearm 
offenses, 5 (35.7%) were convicted, one for an arrest that occurred prior to the seizure. Two of 
the convictions were for pointing a firearm, two for carrying a handgun without a license, and 
one for hunting on private land without consent of the landowner.  
[Table 3 here] 
Suicide Outcomes in Indiana’s Gun Seizure Population 
Eleven individuals in the study died from suicide after the gun removal event, according to 
death records obtained from the Indiana Department of Health. Unlike analysis of other 
outcomes in this study, analysis of death following gun removal included all years since the gun 
removal policy began through December, 2017, and was not limited to the single year following 
a given gun removal event. Additionally, 3 decedents whose cause of death was listed as “drug 
overdose” had made documented suicide threats and engaged in suicidal behavior around the 
time of gun removal. Based on this additional information about suicidality obtained from the 
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gun seizure records, these 3 self-injury deaths were counted suicides for our analysis, for a total 
of 14 (3.5%).  
All but one of the 14 individuals who died of suicide were white males. Their ages ranged 
from 22 to 74 years, with an average of 43.2 years. U.S. military veterans were over-
represented; 4 (28.6%) of the suicide decedents were veterans, compared to 9.5% of the 
Indiana adult population, according to the US Census and US Department of Veterans Affairs.  
The study population’s suicide rate was 421 per 100,000 per year, averaged over the 
period from the date of gun removal to the date of death or study end. This rate is 
approximately 31 times higher than the average age-adjusted suicide rate in the general adult 
population of Indiana during the same period, and 15 times higher than the suicide rate for 
adult males in the state during this time.1  
Seven of the 14 suicides were carried out with firearms, 4 by drug overdose, and 3 by 
hanging. The proportion of these suicides that involved guns was lower than the corresponding 
proportion for men in the general population of Indiana (50% vs. 58%, respectively), and 
substantially lower than would have been expected in a population of gun owners (65% or 
higher).17 However, it is notable that 3 individuals obtained access to another firearm within 12 
months after the gun seizure and died by suicide with a firearm. One of these gun deaths 
occurred just one day after firearm removal; the others occurred 36 and 103 days after gun 
removal. 
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An average of three firearms per individual were seized from subjects who eventually died 
of suicide; handguns were removed in 11 of the 14 cases. The court had retained the seized 
firearms at the hearing in 10 of the 14 cases. In two cases in which the court had not retained 
the firearms, the individuals who got their guns back later used a firearm in suicide. The period 
of time between the date of gun removal and the date of death by suicide was approximately 
eight months longer for those who used guns than for those who used other means (average 40 
vs. 32 months).  
We followed the approach described by Swanson and colleagues17 to estimate that the 
study population had made approximately 131 (largely nonfatal) suicide attempts by differing 
means over an average of 36 months following gun seizure. In a counterfactual scenario in 
which no firearms would have been removed from any of these individuals, and assuming that 
this study population of gun owners would have been as likely as other male gun owners to use 
a gun in any suicide attempt, we calculated that an additional 39 suicide deaths would have 
occurred over the study period. Dividing the total population of gun seizure cases by this 
estimated number of averted suicides yields 1 life saved for every 10.1 gun-removal actions.  
INTERVIEWS OF POLICE AND LEGAL ACTORS  
Five in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants, who were knowledgeable 
individuals having different roles and perspectives regarding the gun seizure law. Informants 
included a prosecutor with extensive experience representing the state in gun seizure cases, 
two judges who adjudicated many of these cases in initial and follow-up hearings, and two 
police officers with experience in carrying out gun removal actions. In what follows, we present 
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interview excerpts that are illustrative of these legal professionals’ and law enforcement 
officers’ perceptions of implementation, effectiveness, and fairness of the law. 
Implementation of the gun seizure law  
Enacting a preemptive gun seizure law was controversial in Indiana, a state where hunting 
and gun collecting are valued traditions, gun rights are cherished, and “gun control” tends to be 
viewed with suspicion. According to the prosecutor: 
Most people have a very definite opinion about their right to bear arms and, as a kid 
growing up on a farm where we hunted and target-shot and everything else, I kind of 
get that.  
Initially, some legal professionals were skeptical about the law, while others were 
supportive, according to one of the interviewees. A judge stated that his fellow judicial officers 
“were very surprised [this law] was found to be Constitutional.” But the prosecutor believed 
that most prosecutors, especially those with long experience, were in favor of risk-based 
preemptive gun seizure to ensure public safety:  
I think there was some mixed feeling about it, but I think a lot of prosecutors—a lot of 
what I call the old-timers, the ones that had been around a long time and had seen a lot 
of things happen—they applauded it.  
Attitudes among police officers also varied. According to one of the judges, many officers 
disapproved of the law’s potential “overreaches … [and] the idea of firearm seizure.” However, 
a police officer stated that his fellow officers “all like” the law, mainly because it is the police 
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whose lives are often on the line in cases involving risky people with guns. In this officer’s 
opinion, older officers supported the law from the outset, due to having witnessed gun violence 
involving people who were known to pose a high risk.  
The informants were asked to describe some of the challenges to implementing the gun 
removal law once it had been enacted. The prosecutor described the early roll-out of the law as 
“pretty rocky,” because the law was unprecedented:   
[T]there was nothing [like it], no precedent for it, and so working out…the procedure of 
officers getting information and getting it into the courts to be able to get the guns…was 
our biggest issue.  
All interviewees stated that more specific policies and procedures, including training for the 
police, should have been developed prior to implementation. The prosecutor made the point 
directly:   
Pass the law, okay. Then the first thing they need to do is sit down with [those] 
involved—the courts, law enforcement, the prosecutors, and the defense—and work 
out a procedure for moving these cases through the courts effectively so that they can 
flush out some of the issues that might come up, ahead of time…. The second is 
education, especially with police officers, about what they are going to need to know 
and do when they respond [to a gun seizure call].  
Perceived effectiveness of the gun seizure law 
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 Despite the “pretty rocky” start and initial uncertainty about the process of preemptive 
gun seizure, all informants noted that, after the law went into effect, prosecutors and police 
eventually worked together to ensure legal enforcement and the advancement of strong cases 
that would hold up in a hearing. Still, it often fell to police officers in the field to improvise and 
work out the complex logistics of the process, including protocols for documentation, safe 
removal of firearms from respondents’ homes, warehousing the firearms, and returning guns to 
respondents. A police officer described what eventually became routine police practice in gun 
seizures involving individuals who appear to be mentally ill or emotionally unstable: 
[W]hat the uniformed officers will do is place the person under an immediate detention 
and transport them to the nearest hospital. If it’s a veteran, they try to get them in the 
VA or the nearest hospital to the location where the person lives…. [The officers] will 
collect any firearms on the scene…. [G]enerally, the person will tell them, “This was the 
gun I was going to use,” or a family member will say, you know, “That’s what he had in 
his hand when I called you.” The officers will take it. Generally, they ask, “Are there any 
other firearms in the home?” And the person will [say], “Yeah, I’ve got a, you know, 
shotgun in my closet” – that sort of thing. They try to collect all the firearms that are in 
the home, and they go into the property room [while] the person [is] placed under 
immediate detention … and the petition is presented to the prosecutor’s office.  
The officer went on to describe a process that was developed in which the documentation 
supporting multiple cases of gun seizures are batched and processed together by single 
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individuals with different roles (i.e., screening, presentation in court, adjudication) in order to 
maximize efficiency and consistency.  
[A] lot of times we find several other incidents and we put them all together in a packet 
[where we list] probable cause [and] all of the specific firearms that we want to keep 
and we take—we have one screener who looks at all those cases and one prosecutor 
who takes them before the judge. So, try to get consistency that way because one 
person is making the decisions [about] what’s going to go here and one person is 
deciding, you know, who they need to ask to come in and what to give to the judge, so, 
try to keep as small as possible the subjectiveness into them by having one person do 
this and one do that.  
Informants characterized the most common scenarios resulting in gun removal to involve 
suicide risk and serious mental illness. Both police officers described the most common 
scenario in similar terms: a concerned citizen calls police about a family member who is 
threatening or contemplating suicide and has a gun. One of the judges also cited suicide risk as 
the major concern in many gun seizure cases but added that psychosis was also important. 
Most of it’s this depression and, and suicide threat but then the others that I’ve seen 
are, in my humble opinion, seriously affected by mental illness… they’re very paranoid 
…. Some are psychotic, I mean, they’re actively, in the courtroom, displaying very 
strange behavior. 
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The prosecutor stated that the two most common scenarios involved people with “mental 
health conditions” and people threatening domestic violence. 
When asked whether they think the law has been effective, both judges suggested that the 
law’s potential benefit has been hampered by its limited implementation, mainly because key 
legal actors in the process (police, prosecutors, public defenders, and judges) have little 
awareness of the law. 
I think most people are not really aware of it…even judges…. There’s only one court in 
the thirty-six courts that deals with these [cases], and I don’t know how many are 
presented to the court right now…. So I don’t think many judges—or anyone else, for 
that matter—knows much about the law. 
I have a feeling it’s probably not used enough, maybe because police officers don’t 
realize it [exists]… I think [the prosecutors] figured it was so much of a non-entity they 
weren’t very worried about it… and I think the public defender’s office, they took more 
of a back seat than they did for a regular case. 
On whether gun seizure is fair 
Apart from the question of whether removing guns from putatively risky people is an 
effective policy, an important question of ethics and law is whether it is fair. The answer 
involves balancing the risk of harm that might occur if guns are not removed from a person, 
against the potential infringement of the individual’s Constitutional right to gun ownership if 
guns are removed without good cause.  
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When asked whether the gun seizure law is “fair,” one judge who supported the law 
responded, “I don’t know that this particular [law] is about fairness. I think this is about safety.” 
The judge’s statement appears to assume that public safety can take priority over ensuring 
fairness to an individual. This could imply the view that perceived “unfairness” to a few 
individuals might be an acceptable social cost for a policy that could protect many others.  
A more equivocal opinion was expressed by one of the police officers. He suggested that 
judgements of “fairness” are a matter of perspective and of whose interests are being 
considered: “If you’re looking at protecting society, yes [the law is fair]. If you’re the person 
looking at having your gun seized, then probably no…. [I]t depends on your perspective.”  
The prosecutor answered the question about fairness in a third way, by focusing on the 
limits that the law places on the reach and duration of gun seizures; the requirement that 
police officers have strong evidence of dangerousness; and the legal due-process features that 
are built into the gun removal procedure as authorized in the statute: 
There are checks…within that statute that don’t allow the state unfettered access to 
people’s homes for [gun removal] … [N]obody just comes in and takes [the guns]. There 
has to be a basis for thinking that that individual has a weapon…and could present a 
danger to other people… Part of the reason for [the police] setting up this history of 
going back to the same address a lot…is establishing that there is a basis for getting the 
weapons in the first place. But once the weapon is taken, it’s not like anybody is being 
denied a particular right that they believe they have, because the state is also restricted 
in how long they can hold [the gun]—and if they think they need it longer, they have to 
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present an argument for why…. So, yeah, I think it’s fair. I think it’s a balanced law and I 
think it’s been used pretty wisely. 
Some individuals in these cases voluntarily agreed to give up their guns, and mental health 
information was sought and considered in judicial decisions about whether to return the guns. 
A judge related such a case:  
So a street officer went there, got ahold of the supervisor, and the individual voluntarily 
gave up his guns. So typically when that happens you have to put [the guns] in the 
property room and you mark “return to claimant” so they have to come get their guns. 
They e-mailed me the next day. I arranged for a mental health professional to do a 
home visit. Based on what she sent me back, I got ahold of [a sergeant] to say “Hey, I 
don’t think he should get his guns back. Can you start [the process under the gun seizure 
law]?”  
A police officer also explained the role of liaison with the mental health system in 
facilitating appropriate intervention in the case of mentally ill gun seizure respondents, 
particularly those who may not yet be experiencing a dangerous mental health crisis but could 
benefit from treatment to prevent such a crisis from occurring. 
I get the phone call on the borderline ones … that they’re not ready to be immediately 
detained, [but] “Can we do some follow-up? What do you think?” And I’ve asked 
officers to do this, so I can try and get someone there, or get them into an appointment 
before they’re in crisis. That’s our goal at the moment…We have a mental health person 
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in the East district and we’re talking about hiring two more. So we should be doing a lot 
more home visits, at least my unit. I mean we weren’t tasked with it originally, but we 
do it anyway.  
 An important goal of the gun seizure action, according to this officer, is to use it as an 
opportunity to identify individuals in crisis who need mental health treatment, and to provide 
access to treatment. Doing this effectively, however, may require additional resources for the 
police and the public mental health system. 
DISCUSSION 
An important rationale for risk-based gun removal laws is that there are certain individuals 
who temporarily pose an elevated risk of violence or self-harm, but who are not otherwise 
prohibited from purchasing and possessing firearms by a prior criminal record; they would likely 
pass a background check to buy a gun from a licensed dealer. Whether the law in Indiana 
appropriately targeted such individuals is an empirical question, to be answered in part by 
examining the criminal records and death records of those who were subjected to gun seizure. 
What was their recent arrest and conviction history, and did it change following the gun seizure 
intervention? Did they have a lower chance of dying by suicide following gun removal? 
With respect to these questions, Indiana’s experience with its risk-based firearm removal 
law is of particular interest in comparison to that of Connecticut, which has been described in 
our previous study.17 Parker19 has previously described the operation of the Indiana firearm 
removal law. The two states differ markedly in several ways relevant to firearms policy: Indiana 
has a more conservative state legislature, fewer gun control laws, more gun-owning 
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households, and more gun deaths in proportion to its population than Connecticut. Yet in both 
states, gun removal laws emerged as a crisis-driven legislative action in response to a critical 
incident—a highly publicized gun homicide that threatened public safety (see Refs. 17 and 19 
for descriptions of those tragedies). And in both states, as the laws have been implemented, 
their most common use has been in cases of suicidality, at the initiation of concerned family 
members. 
The profile of persons typically subjected to risk-based gun seizure is quite similar in both 
states: gun-owning men in their middle years, who experience an emotional crisis, contemplate 
suicide, and make someone who is close to them aware of their intent. Matched death records 
revealed a suicide rate in the study population 31 times higher than that of the general adult 
population of Indiana during the same period; the comparable risk ratio in Connecticut was 40. 
Also consistent with our Connecticut study’s findings, the Indiana data show that for every 10 
gun-seizure actions, approximately 1 life was saved through an averted suicide.  
One notable difference is that the Indiana gun seizure respondents were more likely to be 
arrested during the 2-year period surrounding the gun removal event than the risk-warrant 
subjects in Connecticut (25% vs. 12%). However, this difference appears to be due mainly to the 
fact that the Indiana data contained all arrests, whereas the Connecticut study only reported on 
arrests leading to conviction. When the two groups are compared solely on convictions, the 
results are more similar—16% in Indiana vs. 12% in Connecticut.   
There are different ways of looking at the arrest prevalence data from the Indiana gun 
seizure cases. On the one hand, a substantial majority (about 3 out of 4) of these individuals 
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were never arrested, which is consistent with the idea that the policy provides a non-
criminalizing public safety intervention in cases where law-abiding gun owners experience a 
dangerous psychological crisis. On the other hand, 1 in 4 were arrested within a two-year 
period surrounding gun seizure, and this is a rate much higher than that of the general 
population of adults in Indiana.  
It is also of interest that only about 1% of these individuals were arrested for a gun-related 
charge in connection with the gun seizure event itself, and only about 0.5% were convicted on 
such a charge. This suggests that gun removal under the statute is appropriately being carried 
out as a civil legal matter, not a criminal matter. The evidence is insufficient, however, to show 
whether the gun seizure reduced the likelihood of gun-related crimes in the coming year than 
in the previous year.  
The qualitative material extracted from interviews with stakeholders in the gun seizure 
process paints a mixed picture of tempered enthusiasm for the law. Most of those interviewed 
found some fault with the law, such as the fact that gun seizure under the statute does not 
confer a prohibition on purchasing a new gun. And almost everyone reported thinking the law 
should have had a better roll-out initially, with proper orientation and formal procedures in 
place for police officers, prosecutors, and judges, so that the various participants in the process 
could have been better prepared to assume their respective roles to ensure the law’s timely 
use, effectiveness, and fairness. That uncertainty and necessity, however, also produced on-
the-ground innovation. For example, legal actors developed an efficient process where groups 
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of gun seizure cases could be bundled together and screened, presented in court, and 
adjudicated at the same time.  
The key informants generally considered Indiana’s gun removal process to be fair. Still, the 
fact that a statewide law was apparently only being implemented in one county and in one 
particular (criminal) court could raise larger questions about equity. It should be noted that 
Indiana’s gun removal process is enabled by a statute that does not require police to obtain a 
warrant in advance of the gun seizure action in situations where there is imminent danger. The 
batch-processing of gun removal cases would not have been feasible under the strictures of an 
advance-risk-warrant type of law such as Connecticut enacted. But what the process gains in 
efficiency for the police and legal system, it could lose in terms of timely compliance with the 
statutory guideline of holding a hearing within two weeks following any gun seizure action. 
Batching cases together for processing meant holding some cases for a long enough period to 
allow the cases to accumulate. The study found that on average, 287 days elapsed from the 
date of gun seizure to the date of a court decision regarding the return or retention of seized 
firearms; the statutory guideline is 14 days.  
LIMITATIONS 
 The analysis is limited by the relatively small size of the population of gun seizure cases in 
Indiana (N=395), as well as missing information on the outcome of court hearings, which was 
available on less than half of the cases (n=108). The interview results are limited also by the 
small number of key informants (n=5) and the fact that they may not have been representative 
of the range of beliefs, opinion, and perspectives among legal actors in the gun seizure process 
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in Indiana; for this reason, we present the interview material as illustrative of selected 
knowledgeable individuals’ views, not necessarily representative of the population of social 
actors in gun seizure in Indiana.  
 The analysis of the law’s effectiveness based on the suicide outcome data is also limited, 
insofar as it depends on an extrapolated estimate of the number of attempted suicides, rather 
than a direct empirical assessment of suicide attempts. Moreover, the “counterfactual” analysis 
had a shortcoming that could possibly have resulted in an underestimate of the number of 
averted suicides. Specifically, our estimate assumes that gun removal works mainly by shifting 
the distribution of methods among suicide attempters towards more survivable means of 
suicide than a firearm. However, it is possible that gun removal prevented some suicides by 
preventing an attempt altogether. For example, this could have occurred if gun removal 
resulted in a referral to mental health treatment. We have no information to estimate how 
many non-attempters (people in the study population who never attempted suicide by any 
means) might have died of suicide with a gun if their guns had not been taken away or might 
have used some other means if they had not been referred to treatment as an indirect benefit 
of the gun removal event. If there were a fair number of such (unobservable) events, this could 
translate into a larger population-level effect. 
CONCLUSION 
Significantly reducing gun violence in America is a complex policy puzzle with many pieces, 
including: developing sharper risk-correlated criteria for denying gun purchases, strengthening 
the enforcement of illegal gun trafficking laws, eliminating some of the important social and 
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psychological determinants of violent behavior and self-harm, and fostering a culture of gun 
safety. One promising puzzle piece is an innovative state law, presently enacted in 13 states and 
the District of Columbia and under consideration in several more, that allows family members 
and law enforcement officers to set in motion a legal process whereby firearms can be removed 
from people who pose a high risk of violent behavior or suicide, even if they have not 
committed a crime, and to have the police hold the firearms for up to 5 years under the 
authority of a non-criminalizing civil court order. Challenges remain for advocates who would 
wish to see preemptive risk-based gun removal laws broadly enacted and implemented; these 
legal tools have yet to fulfill their potential in helping to reduce the toll of gun violence in 
America. The evidence to date from Connecticut and Indiana’s experiences with such laws 
suggests that these challenges can be met, and that there is ample common ground upon which 
responsible gun owners and non-gun-owners could stand together in considering and studying 
such laws in other states. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Characteristics of firearm seizure cases in Indiana (N=395)  
Characteristic 
Number, 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated 
(Percent, 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated) 
Gender     
 Male 318 (80.5) 
 Female 77 (19.5)     
Age in years Mean=42.8 (Range: 17-86) 
    
Race/ethnicity   
 White 301 (76.2) 
 Other 94 (23.8)     
Reason for gun seizure (not mutually exclusive)   
 Suicidal ideation 269 (68.1) 
 Homicidal ideation 83 (21.0) 
 Domestic disturbance 112 (28.4) 
 Acute mental illness, cognitive impairment 67 (17.0) 
 Drug or alcohol intoxication 104 (26.3) 
 Other 14 (3.5) 
    
Number of firearms removed per case Mean=2.7 (Range: 1-82) 
    
Number of firearms removed, by type   
 Handguns 548 (50.8) 
 Long guns or not described 531 (49.2) 
 Total 1,079 (100.0)     
Action taken by police at the scene of firearm removal   
 Not arrested   
    Transported involuntarily to a hospital for evaluation 273 (69.1) 
    Transported voluntarily to a hospital for evaluation 38 (9.6) 
    Not transported to a hospital or arrested 52 (13.2) 
 Arrested   
    Transported involuntarily to a hospital for evaluation, and arrested 19 (4.8) 
    Arrested at the scene of gun removal and transported to jail 13 (3.3) 
        
 
 
Table 2. Documented reason for gun risk concern among gun seizure respondents who were arrested and not arrested 
at the time of gun seizure, the year before, or the year after (n=395) 
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  NOT ARRESTED (n=296) ARRESTED (n=99)  
  Number (Percent) Number (Percent) 
Statistical 
significance 
Suicidal ideation (n=269) 214 (72.3) 55 (55.6) ** 
Homicidal ideation (n=83) 50 (16.9) 33 (33.3) ** 
Domestic violence (n=112) 78 (26.4) 34 (34.3)  
Substance involvement (n=104) 76 (25.7) 28 (28.3)  
Mental/cognitive health (n=67) 52 (17.6) 15 (15.2)  
Other (n=14) 14 (4.7) 6 (6.1)  
Statistical significance: ** p<0.01 
Sum of columns exceeds 100% because more than one reason may be noted.     
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Table 3.  Arrests and convictions at the time of gun seizure, the year before, or the year after: severity of and gun 
involvement in most serious charge (n=395). 
  UCR TIER 1:  UCR TIER 2:              
  INDEX CRIMES1 OTHER CRIMES2 NON-GUN CHARGE GUN CHARGE ANY ARREST 
  N (Percent) N (Percent) N (Percent) N (Percent) N (Percent) 
ARRESTED                     
No 367 (92.9) 309 (78.2) 314 (79.5) 381 (96.5) 296 (74.9) 
At seizure3 7 (1.8) 13 (3.3) 15 (3.8) 5 (1.3) 20 (5.1) 
Year before 7 (1.8) 33 (8.4) 35 (8.9) 3 (0.8) 38 (9.6) 
Year after 15 (3.8) 49 (12.4) 51 (12.9) 8 (2.0) 58 (14.7) 
                      
CONVICTED                     
No 386 (97.7) 336 (85.1) 345 (87.3) 390 (98.7) 332 (84.1) 
At seizure4 2 (0.5) 9 (2.3) 9 (2.3) 2 (0.5) 11 (2.8) 
Year before 0 (0.0) 20 (5.1) 19 (4.8) 1 (0.3) 20 (5.1) 
Year after 7 (1.8) 32 (8.1) 34 (8.6) 2 (0.5) 36 (9.1) 
Note: Sum of columns exceeds 100% because people may have been arrested before, during, and after gun seizure. 
1 FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) index crimes:  criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, arson 
2 FBI Uniform Crime Report other:  other assaults (simple, non-aggravated), forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, 
embezzlement, stolen property offenses (buying, receiving, possessing), vandalism, weapons violations (carrying, 
possessing), prostitution and commercialized vice, other sex offenses, drug law violations, gambling, offenses against 
the family and children, driving under the influence, liquor law violations, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, 
suspicion, loitering, all other offenses.  
3 Arrest occurred within 4 days before or after the gun seizure event.          
4 Conviction connected to an arrest that occurred within 4 days before or after the gun seizure event.   
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